Value Competition

Management and Law Comparative Paper--Outline

What follows is an outline of a paper that would review and revisit the themes of Barley and Kunda (1992) and Eastman and Bailey (1998); the idea would be to submit it for the AoM conference this summer in Montreal and then revise it for journal publication:

a) Intro--paper theme--a new look at the historical, cyclical, materialist classification of management scholarship by B & K and the different historical classification of management and legal scholarship by E & B, which is non-cyclical and idealist;

b) Predicting the recent past--does B & K's approach or E & B's work better to explain trends in management scholarship and education since the 1990s when B & K and E & B wrote?  How about trends in legal education?

c)  The basic dichotomy between utilitarianism and deontology; the prevalence of the former in management and of the latter in law;

d) Utilitarian-Benthamite and deontological-Kantian approaches to mediating the fact-value antinomy;

e) How management with its predominantly utilitarian mediation surfaces methodological "rationality of means" value competition and represses substantive "rationality of ends" value competition; how law with its predominantly deontological mediation surfaces substantive value competition and represses methodological value competition;

f) The greater salience of business ethics as a field relative to legal ethics; why the utilitarian mediation of management leads to the rise of business ethics and why the deontological mediation of law leaves legal ethics as a backwater;

g) The growth of a methodological split in the legal academy with the rise of law and economics; management in that respect as pointing the way for law;

h) Relevance of the analysis for management education;

i) Conclusion.

Administrative Tenure

This blog is about the analysis of values, including left and right values, and is not intended to be a forum for the expression of my own or other people's left and right values.  Accordingly, I'm a bit reluctant to include the following post, which consists of my testimony in Trenton last Thursday against tenure for principals, assistant superintendents, and other public school administrators.  The post does hook into the one I did a little while ago on how both parties have supporters (unions for the the Democrats, religious exclusivists for the Republicans) who are useful for the party and arguably the polity in enhancing voice for lower status people, but are also detrimental in policy terms.  Also, this post and my general interest in the administrative tenure issue could be regarded as an outgrowth or application of the value competition program--of course, the causality might actually run the other way, with my experiences with the school board, the Community Coalition on Race, etc. driving the program.

Since I find the left-of-center case for job security for bosses much more elusive than the left-of-center case for security for lower-ranking, lower-status workers, I think the administrative tenure issue is one on which liberals and Democrats as well as conservatives and Republicans may see a need for reform.  I'll be working with other South Orange-Maplewood school board members to push this issue forward--it'll be interesting to see what if any success we have. 

Why New Jersey Should End Administrative Tenure

[remarks prepared for General Assembly Education Committee hearing 12-3-09]

Wayne Eastman

South Orange-Maplewood Board of Education

430 Meeker Street

South Orange, NJ 07079    

weastman@business.rutgers.edu 

(973) 353-1001     

Good afternoon.  I’m Wayne Eastman, a member of the South Orange-Maplewood Board of Education, elected in 2006 and re-elected in 2009.  My background, briefly: I’m a professor in the Supply Chain Management and Marketing Sciences Department at Rutgers Business School-Newark and New Brunswick who was formerly a practicing lawyer in New York and New Jersey and who teaches business law and business ethics.  As acting director in 2007 of the Prudential Business Ethics Center at Rutgers, I organized a Rutgers Ethics Initiative on ethics in New Jersey government that led to a report covering pay-to-play, dual office-holding, and other matters.   Today I am speaking on behalf of the South Orange-Maplewood Board of Education in one respect, in that we have agreed as a body that administrative tenure as it now exists in New Jersey public schools should not be continued, and have established a Lobbying Committee to advance that position and other positions we hold collectively.  On the specifics of what I’m saying, though, I note that the words and arguments I’m using are my own rather than a collective position of the Board.

I want to begin by expressing my appreciation to Assemblyman Cryan.  I and three other members of the South Orange-Maplewood Board of Education—our President, Mark Gleason, the chair of our Lobbying Committee, Rowland Bennett, and another member of that committee, Beth Daugherty, along with our lawyer, Jessica deKoninck--had an excellent meeting back in mid-October in which the four of us on the Board expressed our opposition to administrative tenure.  The Asemblyman expressed strong interest in the topic and told us he would hold a hearing in the form of a round-table discussion in the lame-duck session.   A few weeks later, though, the Governor’s race turned out rather differently from what Assemblyman Cryan said he expected.  I would not have blamed the Assemblyman or anyone else if he had regarded his October statement to us as having an implicit contingency clause that his favored candidate for Governor win, given the understandable depth of his commitment to that candidate.  But Assemblyman Cryan went ahead with this hearing, and for that I strongly thank him.  I also want to express optimism about what I think this hearing can lead to.  Much as some issues--such as teacher tenure—are difficult or impossible to get a consensus on across partisan and ideological lines as of December 2009, I believe that the issue of ending administrative tenure while at the same time providing reasonable protection for current and new educational administrators is one that a Democratic legislature and a Republican governor can come together on right now.  The people of New Jersey need to see that their newly-elected leaders can work together to advance accountability and effectiveness in public education.  There is no better issue for that than administrative tenure, and I regard Assemblyman Cryan’s decision to proceed with this hearing as a highly hopeful sign that we can move forward together on this issue in New Jersey soon. 

Now, on to the substance of my remarks.  I have three main points to make.  First, based on my on-the-ground experience as a school board member for four years, I believe that administrative tenure is not a minor or abstract issue.  Rather, I believe it is a very serious obstacle to accountability and effectiveness in public education.  Second, administrative tenure is fundamentally contrary to the logic of having administrators be accountable to a school district’s top manager, the school superintendent. Finally, the tide of reform in the states and nationally is running against administrative tenure.  In the remainder of my written statement I will expand on these three points.  In the last part, I will then respond to three concerns about the abolition of administrative tenure and explain how abolition can be done in a way that is fair to current and new administrators.  At the end, I include a few links that may be helpful. 

I.  Administrative Tenure Is a Big Problem

Based on my experience on the South Orange-Maplewood Board of Education, administrative tenure is a central obstacle to a superintendent running a school district sensibly, not a minor or peripheral issue.  What I’m going to say in this section is somewhat cryptic, given that both our able board attorney and my own background as a lawyer counsel me to avoid unnecessary references to pending or potential litigation or to individuals.   In making these remarks, I also want to stress that I regard my district’s administrators, past and present, as a highly skilled and dedicated group.

Now, the blunt part of what I have to say.  Many hours of board discussion and many thousands of dollars have been wasted in our district because of administrative tenure and litigation it spawned.  Without administrative tenure, it is possible that litigation would have occurred anyway, given that government employees have—and in my view should have—due process rights.  But without administrative tenure, any such litigation would have merely been a nuisance suit, rather than the significant drain on time and money that we have actually experienced.

In my experience, the requirement that a superintendent and a board make a decision within a limited number of years—frequently less than three because of shorter clocks for administrators with certain kinds of previous experience--on whether someone should have what amounts to a lifetime job as a high-level manager like a principal or assistant superintendent is a terrible one.  Even when nothing goes dramatically wrong, tenure plays a central, deforming role in high-level personnel decisions. I have found myself supporting tenure for principals where I thought that there was very limited evidence on progress in student achievement and building a strong school culture.  Even in cases where I thought there was good evidence of progress, I have never felt confident in what amounts to tying the hands of future superintendents.  The problem goes beyond the length of the tenure clock.  What the superintendent and the board know about a candidate is necessarily time-bound.  To ask a superintendent and a board to proscribe the judgment of all future superintendents and boards by granting tenure to an administrator is to ask them to engage in a fool’s mission.

On the other side of the ledger, I have also found myself troubled by my support for denying administrative tenure.  Absent tenure for administrators, superintendents and boards would be more willing to renew third year candidates who should not be given tenure, but who might prove to be very good if renewed for a year or another contractual period of time.  I’m not claiming that the main reason to end administrative tenure is to avoid firing administrators—but I do believe that some firings of third year administrators that now occur can and should be avoided by ending administrative tenure.

II.  Imagine if Christie (or Corzine) Couldn’t Change His Cabinet…

    As a result of an earlier reform, superintendents in New Jersey no longer gain tenure.  But all other administrators do, including the principals responsible for buildings and the central administrators who work closely with the superintendent.  Let me speak bluntly again.  For important administrators like assistant superintendents and principals not to be accountable to the superintendent they report to is absurd, judging not only by the standards of the business world but also by the standards that apply at the top of our state and federal government.  Anyone who proposed that the top staff who implement the vision of a CEO or the cabinet of a Governor or a President should have iron-clad job security would be considered completely out of bounds—but that is in fact the system we have in New Jersey public education. 

    At this point, I want to address the comparison between K-12 education in New Jersey and higher education, the sector in which I work at Rutgers.  There are major parallels between the two sectors.  As one who has tenure myself as a professor and whose wife is a tenured English teacher in a New Jersey high school, I feel those parallels keenly, all the more so because I am also an educational administrator myself as vice chair of my department.  Unlike my faculty position, my administrative position has no job security.  I have a one-year contract and otherwise serve at the pleasure of my chair and my Dean, as do other faculty and non-faculty administrators at Rutgers, who likewise are covered by contracts of differing lengths.  In other words, higher education in New Jersey already has the situation that should apply as well to K-12 education.

I see significant arguments for as well as against the faculty tenure that I and my wife have.  But I see no good reason for administrators whose job is to be accountable to a chair or a Dean or a superintendent to have tenure that makes it next to impossible for that chair or Dean or superintendent to remove them.  Whatever the ultimate merits of teacher or professor tenure, there is a serious case for it that there simply is not for educational administrators, who need to be accountable to the superintendent or dean who hires and evaluates them.

III.  The Trend is Against Administrative Tenure

Administrative tenure as it exists in New Jersey has been a minority position for a long time.  A 1983 survey by the National Association of Secondary School Principals found that only seventeen states had full-scale principal tenure, with the remainder having lesser protection or no principal tenure at all.  Since then, there has been a definite trend toward eliminating administrative tenure.  The best information I have been able to locate on the current situation comes from a document from the National Conference of State Legislatures, the relevant parts of which I have included in the sources section at the end of this statement, and which suggests that New Jersey is one of a small number of states with full-scale administrative tenure.  We may even have the dubious distinction of being the state with the most iron-clad system of administrative tenure, given that New York, which the NCSL document highlights as being similar to New Jersey, has a more limited mandate than we do, in that it does not include assistant superintendents and has been limited further in New York City. 

We should eliminate administrative tenure because it is the right thing to do, not just because we’re worried that Arne Duncan’s next speech or the latest federal regulations for Race to the Top eligibility will include administrative tenure here along with laws in California and New York prohibiting the use of student performance data in teacher tenure decisions as examples of reactionary, unjustifiable state laws.  But that concern about being out of step is another good reason for us to move away from administrative tenure in New Jersey.

IV.  But What About…?

    There are a number of concerns that can be raised about the elimination of administrative tenure.  In this section, I give responses to what I believe are the three biggest legitimate concerns and suggest ways in which the elimination of tenure can be accomplished in a way that is fair to current and new administrators.

Q. Isn’t it unfair to take away tenure from administrators who have already gained it?

A. Given the equity issue raised by the question, it makes sense for the elimination of tenure to be prospective rather than retroactive, which is to my knowledge the path followed in states that have eliminated tenure for administrators.  (Also, I would recommend that a provision be added to the legislation to make it clear that is is lawful for districts to offer a package in which a current administrator can voluntarily agree to forgo his or her tenure rights.  Further, it would be reasonable to include a provision stating that nothing in the legislation shall be construed to deny the right of an administrator under state public employment law and the state and federal constitutions as interpreted by the courts to due process in connection with a termination of employment.)

Q.    Isn’t it unduly harsh to fire an administrator who is not up to par as an administrator but was a perfectly good teacher before becoming an administrator?

A. Opinions on this may differ, since one can reasonably say that a teacher who chooses to become an administrator should simply accept the additional risk, just as a teacher does in giving up tenure when moving from one district to another.  In the interest of reaching agreement on legislation and given my own Rutgers experience, I personally believe it would be fine to have an teacher turned administrator retain tenure that he or she possesses in a given district as a teacher.

Q.    Aren’t the problems with corruption and politicization in some New Jersey school districts a good reason to retain administrative tenure?

A.   The overall answer to the question is no.  The reality that some school districts in New Jersey have past and present difficulties with corruption, poor personnel management, and failure to focus on student learning is not a good reason to hold back progress in the large majority of districts that are run professionally.  Instead, a better approach would be to recognize that problems exist in certain districts and to deal with that specific issue.  One reasonable way to do that would be a provision that requires school districts below a certain administratively determined level of performance on the state’s QSAC accountability monitoring to have their terminations of administrators with more than three years experience reviewed by the State Department of Education. 

V.  Conclusion

    The fact that the elected school board of South Orange and Maplewood, two of the deepest blue suburbs in New Jersey, supports the elimination of administrative tenure as we do is significant.  On some issues, my towns aren’t a bellwether.  But on the issue of administrative tenure, we are a very important indicator.  If we are against it, what part of New Jersey is for it?  Republican suburbs or rural areas in Morris County, Sussex County, Monmouth County, and Ocean County?  I think not.  I believe school boards and voters in those solidly Republican areas are with us in rock-ribbed Democratic South Orange-Maplewood in supporting change.  To the extent there are special issues in certain school districts, especially in our cities, they can be dealt with through enhanced state monitoring for these districts, as I’ve suggested.  Across party lines, let’s move forward in New Jersey to join the strong national majority of states and the strong national trend by eliminating administrative tenure and enhancing accountability in our schools.

VI.  Some sources:

1.   The National Association of Secondary School Principals (2000) and (1983): Although their material has some tilt toward the pro-tenure position (for instance, it repeats the frequently made but misleading claim that tenure simply guarantees a hearing and due process, which ignores the reality, clear in my experience as a board member, that it is in fact extremely difficult to remove a subpar tenured public school employee in New Jersey), it also includes an acknowledgement that many principals favor ending principal tenure, and has useful information on trends and the law:

http://www.principals.org/s_nassp/bin.asp?CID=680&DID=50140&DOC=FILE.PDF (2000)

http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/custom/portlets/recordDetails/detailmini.jsp?_nfpb=true&_&ERICExtSearch_SearchValue_0=ED238149&ERICExtSearch_SearchType_0=no&accno=ED238149 (1983)

2.  Education Week: The title of this 1998 article--“Tenured Principals: An Endangered Species”--indicates its theme:

http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1998/03/04/25tenure.h17.html

3.  KPMG Peat Marwick report for North Carolina General Assembly: This 1992 report to the legislature advocates elimination of administrative tenure in North Carolina and notes various ways in which administrators without tenure can be protected from unfair discharge:

http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/GPAC/issue/e/GPACEDU071.pdf

4.  National Conference of State Legislatures document: This undated document, which appears to be a draft, contains information on state tenure laws, which is reproduced below:

 

 

 

7700 East First Place, Denver, Colorado, 80230, 303-364-7700

 

 

PRINCIPAL TENURE

 

 

States that grant tenure to principals:

New Jersey

NJSA 18A: 28-5

http://lis.njleg.state.nj.us/cgi-bin/om_isapi.dll?clientID=478476&Depth=2&depth=2&expandheadings=on&headingswithhits=on&hitsperheading=on&infobase=statutes.nfo&record={7D76}&softpage=Doc_Frame_PG42

 

New York

Education Law § 3012 (1) (b) Tenure: certain school districts.

http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/menugetf.cgi?COMMONQUERY=LAWS

 

Utah

Utah Code Title 53A, Chapter 8, Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act

http://le.utah.gov/~code/TITLE53A/53A08.htm

Tenure for school employees is provided by school district policies or an agreement with an employee association. The Utah Orderly School Termination Act specifies procedures for the termination of tenured employees who have worked a minimum of three years for their employer. Termination Act procedures apply to licensed principals. In Utah, a principal can be hired without having an administrative license, but the person is an at-will employee.

 

States with some protection for principals:

Hawaii - Principals are union employees and enjoy all of the civil service privileges due to their bargaining unit. 

 

Nebraska - Principals are under the same continuing contracts as teachers. Under the group of statutes that are labeled "Tenure" in the codified statutes, teachers and administrators (other than superintendents) are protected from termination after their first 3 years in a district by continuing contracts and may generally only be removed for just cause as defined in the statutes or as part of a reduction in force.

 

Nevada - The Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) do not use the term "tenure" with regard to teacher and administrator employment.  Instead the terms "probationary" and "postprobationary" are used.  These are defined in NRS 391.311.  The following sections provide for employment of teachers and administrators. 

• NRS 391.3197 provides that a probationary employee is someone in his or her first 2 years of employment with the school district.  Receiving notice of employment for the third year entitles the individual to be a postprobationary employee. 
• NRS 391.3196 provides that postprobationary employees have an expectation of reemployment. 
• NRS 391.3197 provides that an administrator who has completed his or her probationary period and is promoted to the position of principal must serve an additional probationary year as a principal.  After that, he or she is a postprobationary employee in the position of principal.
• NRS 391.110 provides for the employment of superintendents.  An initial contract term may not exceed four years.  The term of any subsequent employment may be for any length of time. 
• NRS 391.312  lists grounds for suspension, demotion, dismissal and refusal to reemploy teachers and administrators.

http://www.leg.state.nv.us/NRS/NRS-391.html#NRS391Sec311

 

North Dakota - Principals are under continuing contracts, which includes due process.

http://www.legis.nd.gov/cencode/t151c15.pdf

 

West Virginia - Does not refer to it as "tenure", principals are awarded a  "continuing contract" under West Virginia Code §18A-2-2 after their  first three years of employment.  If you look at that code section,  although this statute refers to "teachers", §18A-1-1 says that   "professional educator" is synonymous with "teacher" and includes  "principals".  The statutes are not clear on the rights of probationary verses continuing contract employees. However, a legislative staff member, after looking at several grievance decisions and supreme  court cases, says that it appears that continuing contract employees are given more rights in terms of the reasons for which they can be dismissed, use  of seniority when a reduction in force occurs, and being placed on a  preferred recall list.  A probationary employee simply can be let go by not renewing his or her contract. 

 

Utilitarian and Deontological Mediations of the Fact-Value Antinomy

Eastman and Bailey (1998) contend that the contemporary legal academy features surfaced value competition in a way that the management academy does not, and advocate management scholarship that is overtly normative in the legal mode.  Their positive claim is partly correct, in that the surfaced clash of substantive political visions—individualist, communitarian, left, right—that is central in law is far more muted in management.  But it neglects an important way in which value competition has traditionally been surfaced in management, but not in law.

Management scholarship represses open competition as to substantive visions—the rationality of ends.  But it surfaces open competition as to methods, in particular between the “rational” and “cultural” poles, to adopt Barley and Kunda’s nomenclature.  Legal scholarship by contrast has traditionally repressed methodological competition.  Law has its own methodological parallel to the rational-cultural split in the form of the division between rules stated in factual terms and standards stated in moral terms.  But this methodological division has not traditionally resulted In anything parallel to the intricate divisions in business schools between calculative and cultural approaches.   Duncan Kennedy, Kathy Sullivan, and others have correctly identified the power of the rules-standards split, but have not prevailed in leading the legal academy toward surfaced methodological competition between rules and standards camps.  What has instead worked to crack open the legal academy on methodological lines is basically the same calculation-culture split that dominates in management, with law and economics as the legal equivalent of the calculative finance/econ and optimization/OR camp in management.

Relating the above to the general Bentham-Kant dichotomy and to the utilitarian and deontological modes of mediating the fact-value dichotomy: Utilitarianism mediates empirically, with a faith that logic plus data will at least some of the time lead to moving the ball forward with better ideas.  Deontology mediates a priori, with a faith in universal rules.  Management features utilitarian mediation, with the calculative and cultural camps engaging in an eclectic local competition to move the ball forward.   Law features deontological mediation, with substantive camps competing time after time after time to establish which is right.

The Implicit Ethical Structures of Management and Legal Education

Why is business ethics more intellectually ambitious and more successful as a field than legal ethics?  A plausible materialist answer is that the professionalization of law has led to legal ethics becoming synonymous with a code of professional responsibility and to a concomitant diminution in intellectual ambition and disciplinary power.  But there is also a potential idealist explanation: The virtues and the flaws of management as an academic discipline map better onto major ethical schools than the virtues and flaws of legal education do.

Management education with its mix of calculative (finance, OM, etc.), cultural (OB, etc.), and mixed disciplines can be justified in eclectic utilitarian terms: To enhance their effectiveness as well as that of their firms and their society, managers should be able to draw on both utilitarian and non-utilitarian approaches.  From the eclectic utilitarian perspective, epitomized by Mill, effectiveness is often enhanced when utilitarianism is not directly relied upon; given that perspective, the central role of the calculation-culture dichotomy in management theory makes sense. 

Management education also can be usefully criticized in philosophical terms.  From a Kantian deontological perspective, there is a serious concern as to whether management forsakes moral seriousness and universality for an endless succession of morally relaxed utilitarian compromises.  From an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective, there is a serious concern over whether the dominant split between calculation and culture in management loses sight of the manager as a whole person with a character in favor of viewing the manager as a device to achieve effective results.  From a communitarian utilitarian perspective a la Peter Singer, management education reinforces the failure to take into account remote but ethically pressing harms and benefits.  From an individualist perspective, management education oversocializes, cultivating organization men and women rather than free spirits.  Because critical stances as well as a justificatory stance on management education can be readily related to major ethical schools, business ethics courses have a reasonably straightforward logic.

By comparison, legal education with its emphasis on inculcating skills in blending and alternating between clear rules that avoid moral language and ambiguous standards that embrace moral language does not readily map onto Bentham, Kant, Aristotle, or other major ethicists.  First, because the utilitarian reason cultivated by law and economics is a subordinate kind of reason that dare not speak its name, there is no bright-line clash between utilitarianism and deontology in law the way that there is in management.  Next, because the legal curriculum is not as fragmented and dichotomizing as the management curriculum, virtue ethics has less critical bite in law than it does in management.  Finally, because legal education lacks the preoccupation management education has with the individual, firm, and social levels, individualist and communitarian critiques map less well onto law than to management.  For all that the structure of legal as well as management education has significant ethical content for the people who go through it, the structure does not accord as closely with major ethical theories in law as  it does in management.

Predicting the Recent Past

If Barley and Kunda (1992) are right in hypothesizing that management theory cycles between rational and normative poles according to broad economic trends, with better times for American business corresponding to the ascendance of rational theory, it would have been reasonable to expect a turn away from the cultural theory of the 1980s to a renascent rational theory in the 1990s and 2000s, given the generally though not unrelievedly good times for the American version of capitalism from the fall of the Nikkei and the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the financial crisis of 2008. As a prediction, that looks reasonably good, especially if we give Barley and Kunda credit for calling the turning of the American economic wheel from the nervous 1970s and 1980s of malaise and Japan as #1 that preceded their article. Even if we do not credit them with being economic seers and focus solely on management theory of the last two decades with the economy as an exogenous factor, their hypothesis is quite defensible. The rise of agency theory as not simply a finance model but as a major stream within the management academy itself; the reinvention of OR and OM in the rising field of supply chain management; the increasing financialization of management consulting theory and practice, at the same time that consulting replaced medicine and law as the most desired destination for Ivy League graduates; the popular success of Moneyball, Freakonomics and other books selling rationality and incentives rather than culture and teamwork: These phenomena can all be cited as support for the case that the recent, apparently ended good times did indeed go along with a wave of rational theory.

If Eastman and Bailey (1998) are right in hypothesizing that management theory has entered into a long-term period of value partisanship associated with the breakdown of earlier formalist and consensualist approaches to mediating the fact-value dichotomy, it would have been reasonable to expect that the 1990s and 2000s would have been a period of intensified surfacing of value disputation in management, along the lines already prevalent in law. Some evidence can be cited in support of that proposition: Compared to twenty years before, the division structure of the Academy of Management in 2009 shows an increased number and proportion of divisions—Critical Management, Organizations and the Natural Environment, Management and Spirituality—whose missions reflect a clear value-orientation; the rise of the Moneyball/Freakonomics genre has gone along with the rise of a counter-genre, epitomized by Irrational Exuberance and Predictably Irrational, that emphasizes how human beings deviate from rational choice; and the rise of agency theory has gone along with a vigorous counter-movement arguing that agency theory itself is a major problem for American business and American society. On the other side of the ledger, though, one can cite a diminution of the culture-oriented academic and popular 1980s literature related to flattening hierarchy and liberatory management, as well as a less self-critical tone in 1990s and 2000s theoretical and practitioner literature compared to that of the more anxiety-ridden, less self-confident preceding period, with its concerns about managerial myopia and American decline.

It is interesting to note that law, which Eastman and Bailey rely upon as offering a kind of leading indicator for management, has been characterized over the last twenty years not so much by the rise of value disputes—much as divisions between liberals and conservatives remain central to academic law as well as to the practitioner literature produced by Supreme Court justices--but by the consolidation of law and economics as an ideologically mixed utilitarian alternative to the "rules and principles" mainstream in the legal academy. The result has been a legal academy divided more along the calculation-culture lines that have long prevailed in business schools with their division between more normatively-oriented and more rationally-oriented disciplines. That calculation-culture value split in both its management and legal incarnations lacks the moral intensity of the left-right split, which raises a question about whether the Eastman and Bailey hypothesis of heightened value partisanship holds true in law, and also about whether they were right in seeing law as a leading indicator of trends in management. Perhaps it is management education with its longstanding calculation-culture split that has shown the way for legal education, rather than the reverse.

Two Kinds of Multi-Racial Alliance

One prominent kind of multi-racial alliance sees itself as advocating for racial inclusion and equity and sees its opposition as a group or groups who are indifferent to or hostile to those values.  Another, less prominent kind of multi-racial alliance sees itself as working for values that cross racial lines and sees another side within the firm or community as also working for different values that also cross racial lines.  Both types of alliance can succeed.  The morally-charged single alliance approach has advantages when the objective is the dismantling of a political system of racial exclusion, such as legally segregated schools in the 1950s American South.  The second, two alliance approach has advantages in building a long-term politics in firms and communities that is not polarized along racial lines.  Compared to a racially polarized politics in which members of racial minorities have only the alternative of supporting their side or sitting out, the integration of different races into both sides gives members of racial minorities the power to support either side.   Having that power is beneficial both to racial minorities and to the community or firm as a whole.

Obama's Peace Prize

The following op-ed uses Obama's recent Nobel Prize to combine value competition ideas about good things arising from the competition of self-interested pols with classical/neoclassical economic ideas about good things arising from the competition of self-interested businesspeople:

Robbed by Oslo:

 

Obama and Other Peacemakers Whose Successes Were Overlooked

 

Wayne Eastman

Rutgers Business School—Newark and New Brunswick

1 Washington Park

Newark, NJ 07102

weastman@business.rutgers.edu

(973) 353-1001

 

    With its airy recognition of Barack Obama for potential rather than accomplishment--"for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples"--the Norwegian Nobel Committee did the President and the cause of peacemaking a disservice, but not for the reason that most critics of the award have suggested.

    In fact, Obama would have been a reasonable if controversial choice for a peace prize based on accomplishment, given his substantial contributions as an opposition politician and then as President to the winding down of the war in Iraq.

As an anti-war Democratic candidate in 2007, Obama took the position that the U.S. needed to withdraw large numbers of troops from Iraq relatively quickly.  At the time, that position was highly controversial though popular among many Democratic primary voters, and was opposed by Hillary Clinton, John McCain and other Republican candidates, and the Bush administration.   Two years later, Obama’s position has become conventional wisdom, and has gone along with a major reduction in violence and considerable political progress in Iraq. 

    It is true that the situation in Iraq was and is highly complex, and that figures in addition to Obama--David Petraeus with his military ingenuity and Nouri al-Maliki with his outreach beyond his political base are just two who come to mind—can also be credited with major roles in the reduction in bloodshed and increase in order.  Still, a Nobel award that recognized Obama “for his central role as a democratic opposition politician and then as President in fostering a resolution to a long-running war in Iraq” would have been sound in a way that the actual award citation was not.

Although the oddity of Obama’s being recognized by the Nobel Committee for the wrong reason makes his situation unusual, he stands in a long line of figures in politics and in business over the decades who have made major contributions to peace but have been unrecognized by Oslo, with its chronic bias toward noble gestures and diplomatic agreements.

Unless they engage in dramatic diplomatic deals, hardheaded democratic politicians like Obama who care about winning elections and who often wage war as well as peace are poorly represented in the roster of Nobel Peace Prize winners.  For example, Boris Yeltsin, whose decision to end Russian control over Ukraine and the other parts of the Soviet empire was intertwined with his own electoral calculations as President of Russia and who later went to war in Chechnya, did not win a Nobel.

Given the Nobel Committee’s tilt against practical politicians, Yeltsin’s failure to win is not surprising.  But considering that it was Yeltsin—not Mikhail Gorbachev, who wanted to preserve the Soviet Union—who ended the coercive Russian empire, the Nobel Committee wound up snubbing one of the century’s major contributors to peace. 

Another politician who didn’t fit the Nobel Committee’s preferences for idealism and diplomacy but who made a major peacemaking contribution was Charles de Gaulle.  Given his deep identification with the French military, French nationalism, and French party politics, along with his often undiplomatic diplomacy, de Gaulle did not fit the Nobel Committee’s criteria well at all.  But as the man who led his nation out of a brutal, futile, and very difficult to end war in Algeria in the early 1960s, he would have been a deserving winner.   

Hardheaded businesspeople who worry about profits are even more poorly represented among Nobel Peace Prize winners than hardheaded democratic politicians who worry about elections.  But business leaders who have knit the world together economically have likely done far more for international peace in the past several decades than many actual Nobel winners have. 

For example, Sony founder Akio Morita and long-time Toyota leader Eiji Toyoda would have been worthy Peace Prize recipients, given their roles in transforming a nation that had been convulsed by violent nationalism into a model of how to succeed through economic rather than military strength.  Neither Toyoda’s contributions to a just-in-time inventory system that has encouraged businesses to integrate their operations with those of other businesses around the world nor Morita’s contributions to innovations in electronics that in turn have contributed to a global popular culture fit into the familiar Nobel categories of idealism and diplomacy.   But if the right test is how much a life’s work has moved a nation and the world away from the ways of war to ways of peace, both men would have been good choices.

Given that consequences are tricky to evaluate and that hardheaded democratic politicians and businesspeople have multiple motives and are not saints, recognizing them for contributions to peace will always be controversial.   If Sam Walton had won a Nobel Peace Prize for his central role in knitting together the Chinese and American economies and in doing so enhancing the prospects for world peace, the award would have been simultaneously reasonable and open to reasonable criticism from the many critics of Walton and Wal-Mart.

   Likewise, it would undoubtedly have been controversial if Obama had been recognized in 2009 for his contributions over the last two years to reduced violence in Iraq, given the complexity of the situation there and the close connection between Obama’s actions and his political ambitions.  But such recognition would have been much more sensible than what the Nobel Committee actually did.

There have been all too many Nobels awarded over the years for high-minded but less than effective idealism and ultimately futile diplomatic deals.   Progress toward world peace has depended and will depend in large part on hardheaded, calculating actions by imperfect, unsaintly leaders like Boris Yeltsin, Charles de Gaulle, Akio Morita, Eiji Toyoda, and Sam Walton.  Perhaps in his acceptance speech in Oslo, Barack Obama can employ his formidable gift for explaining to tell us how he is proud to be one of those leaders, rather than the plaster saint that the Nobel Committee takes him for.

Post-Left-Right Politics

Assume that the left and the right in their moralistic "I'm right and you're wrong" forms are useful in certain settings (notably legislative politics and litigation) in which exit costs are high, surfaced conflict is acceptable, and substantial self-segregation of the opposing camps is practical, but are not useful in certain other settings (such as workplaces and social groups) in which self-segregation is undesirable, close collegial relations are important, and exit costs are low.   Further assume that these flexible economic and cultural organizations constitute the major frontier domains for politics in the future.  Is it possible for such organizations to gain some of the benefits of value competition--harder work, innovation, etc.--without the contextually unacceptable moralism of the left and the right?

One way post-left-right politics might work: Consider a six-way division on two dimensions, ideology and culture-economics, involving left cultural and economic organizations (in which the right is unacceptable), right cultural and economic organizations (in which the left is unacceptable), and centrist cultural and economic organizations (in which the left and the right are both unacceptable).  The key idea here is that the relevant dichotomies will have to be different for the different types of organizations; the competing/cooperating sides that will work to create a more mutually respectful, less moralistic politics for a left cultural organization are not the same as those that will work for a right cultural organization, and a centrist cultural organization demands yet another dichotomy.

My nominations for sides in the six types of organizations that could empathize with the other and feel the merits of the other, and in doing so work to foster mutually respectful internal competition in a way that the left and the right can't: 1) for left economic organizations (e.g., government or non-profit offices, schools, unions): Parents and Children (or Teachers and Children); 2) for right economic organizations (e.g., for-profit corporations): Managers and Investors (this division, unlike the other five, is already the basis of an effective cooperative-competitive politics for this type of organization); 3) for centrist economic organizations (e.g., reformist government, non-profit, or for-profit firms, schools, etc.): Yin and Yang; 4) for right cultural organizations (e.g., conservative churches, synagogues, mosques, etc.): Men and Women (or Boys and Girls); 5) for left cultural organizations (e.g., communes): Butches and Femmes; and 6) for centrist cultural organizations (e.g., social clubs, civic clubs): Yin and Yang.

Many ambiguities and debatable points lurk: For example, one might might doubt the viability of a "Women" or "Girls" side in a conservative religious group, and for some such groups the criticism might be correct.  Another question/criticism about the viability of the hypothetical sides: The "true-false" philosophical rationalism of Athens and the "good-evil" religious dualism of Jerusalem have through whatever processes gone along with democracy and rule of law-based civil liberties in the West.  By contrast, the "both sides true and false, both sides good and bad" philosophical dualism of Taoism and more broadly of China, appealing as it may be, has through whatever processes not gone along with democracy and rule of law-based civil liberties.   Given that, why should one feel that leaving the West's left and right behind in favor of the East's yin and yang can foster more democracy in certain kinds of organizations?   A response: The wheel of history brings different ideas to the top; my judgment/guess is that Taoist notions that perhaps did indeed promote quietism and emperor control in their original setting have a much better prospect than left and right of promoting cooperative competition and enhanced democracy within organizations in the contemporary United States.

SCM and CSR: Take 3--Calculation and Culture

Some thoughts: 1) along with or instead of the holistic "calculation-culture" classification system used in my AoM paper last year, develop single word cues to make classifications; 2) examples of how social responsibility initiatives in SCM involve both a calculation and a cultural element--both W-M and Africa supply chain in pharm could fit in here. 

SCM and CSR: Take 2--Africa Supply Chain in Pharma

The efficiency and incentives challenges--relationship between the two.  Efforts by companies, NGOs, governmentsts, academics to increase efficiency and improve incentives.  "Calculation" and "culture" issues associated with efficiency and incentives.  Efforts to align incentives of people working in the supply chain with efficient outcomes.  Issues associated with non-profit distribution.