Value Competition

Reflections on an Unread [Now Semi-Read] Article

Read Jonah Lehrer's piece in the New Yorker on the kerfuffle between E.O. Wilson and his co-authors in a recent math-laden article in Nature (unread by me) and the defenders of Hamilton's inclusive fitness model of altruism  formerly espoused by Wilson himself...was profoundly impressed by Wilson's readiness as an 82-year old to reexamine and revise his assumptions...

I'm strongly with Wilson in wanting an alternative to approaches such as Hamilton's that focus too narrowly on kinship (and also to approaches such as Trivers' that focus too narrowly on reciprocity).   I believe that altruism in the form of taking into account at least some of the payoffs of others as well as one's own payoffs is a reality for many humans and nonhumans in situations involving strangers and one-shot games.  Given that prior belief, I think there is real value to an approach to modeling altruism that explains how at least some kinds of it can be an evolutionarily stable strategy in situations involving non-relatives and one-shot interactions.

But allowing that I haven't read the Wilson, Nowak, Tamita article, I'm quite doubtful that their high-tech approach is the way forward for biologists.  I think the way forward will instead involve a low-techThomas Schelling-Robert Frank inspired understanding of the ways in which selective altruism can be helpful to the altruist in leadership and trust games that are as or more important in the real world than prisoner's dilemmas in which altruism, selective or otherwise, is harmful or at best unhelpful.

....

[Decided I should at least skim the Nature article...checking it out...]

I skimmed the article...I'm still doubtful, not because of the story (defensible nests/strong groupishness/altruism), which seems good (not that I would know either way), but because the story seems to be cast in prisoner's dilemma terms...if so, the mainstream defenders of inclusive fitness/reciprocity, etc. can always make the standard rejoinder that as well as altruists may do with other altruists they will not do well with egoists absent the ability to identify and punish them...the way to get out of this box I think is to tell a story that decenters the Prisoner's Dilemma in favor of coordination/leadership/assurance games in which certain types of altruists take egoists to the cleaners in a one-shot game rather than the other way around...

 

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Carol Gilligan at Paduano: Reflections on the Possible Darwinian Logics of Gendered Ethics of Care and Duty

After just writing a conference paper the other week on five forms of selective altruism that can be related to the work of Plato, Aristotle, Jesus, Adam Smith, and Carol Gilligan, it was a very pleasant surprise to learn that Gilligan was coming to the Paduano seminar.  (The others on my list were unavailable, as one of the seminar organizers quipped to me.)

I thoroughly enjoyed her presentation and the questions yesterday afternoon.  I felt myself some distance closer to appreciating rather than being disturbed by the cross-currents of moral passion and moral skepticism that run through modern politics and science and that I felt both in Gilligan (advocating an ethic of care that simultaneously is its own form of passionate moralism and a form of questioning passionate moralism) and in her questioners (e.g., a man asking whether the ethic of care properly understood suggests opposition to abortion, a woman asking about early-appearing differences between boys and girls). 

CG's account of a gendered split, coming at a young age for boys and at adolescence for girls, between an ethic of care and an ethic of rights-duties made me wonder about various Darwinian stories one could tell about the split and their relative merits...

Story 1: "The split is in some key ways advantageous for men.  Allowing that it has serious negative psychic and practical repercussions for them, it also gives them the figurative and all too often the literal whip hand in human affairs.  For women, for children, and for society, on the other hand, the consequences of the split are clearly negative, even it contributes to reproductive success for people who follow the approved gender scripts.  The question is whether we can join together to overcome a painful split that in the end is harmful for all--very much including men--in favor of a better way of life that liberates people to live in plurality and that elevates democracy over patriarchy."

Story 2: "The split is against our interests as individuals.  We would be richer, fuller, happer people if we did not find ourselves occupying boy-man rights-duties roles or girl-woman care-nurturing roles.  But it is important in raising children to have a friendly opposition between the two ethics.  Just as the opposition between liberals and conservatives makes modern democracies work, the opposition between a male ethic of duty and a female ethic of care has made human child-rearing work for millennia.  The split, painful as it is, is in the interests of children and of society.  One can improve how the split plays out in people's lives, but one needs to respect its underlying logic for our children and our species even as one laments its limiting effects on men and women as individuals."

Story 3: "The split and its associated gender hierarchy is desirable in Darwinian reproductive terms for parents, children, and society as a whole.  More than that, it makes sense at psychic and practical levels.  In order to resolve basic issues of leadership in as effective a way as possible, it makes sense to have people perform their core activities in gender-mized groups--families--with an "A" gender in the family that is the default leader though not necessarily the leader in a given case and a "B" gender that is the default follower though not in all cases.   Making gender hierarchy less rigid may be very useful, but the fundamental idea of gender hierarchy makes sense in evolutionary and practical terms, disturbing as it also is to part of our moral sensibilities."

Story 1 is more or less Gilligan's; Story 2 is what I was spinning out as I was listening to her; Story 3 is one that I just spun out. 

I'll forbear comment on the normative merits and demerits of the stories in favor of a note or two on their scientific issues.  For Story 2, there is an interesting theoretical-practical issue as to how evolution has succeeded in getting us to overcome our individual inclinations toward union in the interest of a split that helps the collective; my quick take is that the problem is not such a big one, since Story 2 relies on an effect on one's offspring that fits fine into mainstream Darwinian reasoning.  For Story 1, the reliance on a split between what works in Darwinian terms and what is actually good for individuals and the species strikes me as fine in theoretical terms.   For Story 3, there is an issue with how the collective benefit of clear leadership works its will on the assigned followers; that doesn't seem like a big problem, though, given a linkage in followers' and leaders' reproductive success through families.  

In other words, all three stories strike me as fine in Darwinian terms, much as they all may reasonably raise hackles for other reasons.  Person A may be bothered by a tendency toward complacency and resignation in Story 2, while Person C worries about demonizing and lack of common sense in Story 1, and Person B is annoyed by what feels like chauvinist piggery in Story 3.  All fair enough--but on the face of it I don't see a basis for A, B, or C trashing their disfavored stories as poor science.

 

 

Herbs, Carns, and Omnis

I have a comment on a problem posted at the NYT Numberplay site.   It's mostly just on Nash equilibria--the general (nonoriginal) point such as it is is that Nash equilibirum is highly relevant even when the "players" are noncalculating because of evolution.

Nice guys don't always finish last

The conventional wisdom on altruism in 2 x 2 games, as I take it: Although altruism can contribute to higher social value, the altruist is destined to lose out to the egoist in their interactions.  Hence altruism will decline over time, absent sufficient ability of altruists to form their own groups and/or to punish those who do not behave altruistically.   The modification to conventional wisdom argued for here: Altruists in games in which mixed Nash strategies are an equilibrum in some cases do better in those equilibria than egoists.  More specifically, altruists do better than egoists in their interactions when the altruist's known altruism leads the egoist to play the altruist's objectively preferred strategy more often than would be the case absent the egoist's knowing he/she is playing with an altruistic player.  Yet more specifically: If the effect of altruism is to narrow the difference in the altruist's payoffs for the egoist strategy that is *more* preferred by the altruist relative to the difference in payoffs for the egoist's strategy that is *less* preferred by the altruist, altruism results in the altruist outperforming the egoist.  In the reverse case in which altruism widens the difference in the altruist's payoffs for the strategy he/she prefers the egoist play relative to the less-preferred strategy, altruism is harmful to the altruist.  The takeaway: Although the cases are symmetrical overall, with the losses from altruism balancing out the gains, there is an important class of 2 x 2 games that broadly relate to leading and following (Chicken, Leadership, and Battle of the Sexes) in which altruism helps the altruist to induce the rational egoist to defer to the altruist.  A concern on the part of leaders and managers for the welfare of those they lead and manage can thus be understood as strategically efficacious.

What follows are matrices for the twelve basic types of symmetrical 2 x 2 games, all played between an egoist and a Benthamite altruist who values the welfare of the other equally with his/her own, that illustrate the foregoing points, along with a concluding summary of the gains and losses from altruism in the different games.   (As will be noted, some of 3-2-1-0 payoffs are modified so that no dominant strategies apply for either player, which allows mixed Nash to be a plausible solution to the games.)

GAME 1: “LIFE IS GREAT”

                                                                            a) Life is Great with Egoists

Life is Great-- ROW payoffs in lower left—COL payoffs in upper right..	COL--                Cooperate	COL-- Defect
ROW--               Cooperate	3                                      3	1     2
ROW-- Defect	2                                    1	0     0

Egoistic equilibrium: R and C cooperate--(3, 3)

 

b)      Life is Great--ALT-EGO:

Life is Great-- ALT payoffs in lower left—EGO payoffs in upper right..	EGO--                Cooperate	EGO-- Defect
ALT--               Cooperate	3                                      6	2     3
Row-- Defect	1                                    3	0     0

ALT-EGO equilibrium: ALT and EGO cooperate--(3, 3)

GAME 2: “LIFE IS GOOD”

d)     Life is Good for Egoists:

Life is Good-- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	Column--                Cooperate	Column-- Defect
Row--               Cooperate	3                                      3	0     2
Row-- Defect	2                                    0	1     1

Egoistic equilibrium: R and C cooperate--(3, 3)

 

e)      Life is Good for ALT-EGO:

Life is Good-- ALT payoffs in lower left—EGO payoffs in upper right..	EGO--                Cooperate	EGO-- Defect
ALT--               Cooperate	3                                      6	0     2
ALT--defect	2                                    2	1     2

ALT-EGO mixed Nash equilibrium: Both cooperate--(3, 3)

GAME 3: “RATIONAL TRUST”

g)      Rational Trust for egoists:

Rational Trust-- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	Column--                   Trust	Column-- Distrust
Row--                   Trust	3                                      3	2     1
Row-- Distrust	1                                   2	0     0

Egoistic equilibrium: R and C cooperate--(3, 3)

 

h)      Rational Trust for ALT-EGO:

Rational Trust-- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	EGO--                Cooperate	EGO-- Defect
ALT--               Cooperate	3                                      6	2     3
ALT-- Defect	1                                    3	0     0

ALT-EGO equilibrium: Both cooperate--(3, 3)

GAME 4: “TRUST”

j)        Trust for egoists:

Trust-- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	Column--                   Trust	Column-- Distrust
Row--                   Trust	3                                       3	2     0
Row--                Distrust	0                                   2	1     1

Egoistic mixed Nash equilibrium: .5 trust--(1.5, 1.5)

 

k)      Trust for ALT-EGO (with payoffs adjusted so trust is not dominant for ALT):

Trust-- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	Column--                Trust	Column-- Distrust
Row--                   Trust	3                                       6	2     2
Row-- Distrust	0                                    2	1.5     3

ALT-EGO equilibrium: ALT trust 3/5, EGO trust 1/7--(5/7 ALT, 57/35 EGO)

GAME 5: “SCHELLING”

m)    Schelling for egoists:

Schelling-- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	Column--                   Focal	Column-- Non-Focal
Row--                   Focal	3                                      3	0     1
Row--                Non-Focal	1                                     0	2     2

Egoistic mixed Nash equilibrium: .25 focal--(1.5, 1.5)

 

n)      Schelling for ALT-EGO:

Schelling-- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	Column--                   Focal	Column-- Non-Focal
Row--                   Focal	3                                      6	0     1
Row--                Non-Focal	1                                     1	2     4

ALT-EGO mixed Nash equilibrium: ALT .25 focal, EGO 3/8 focal--(ALT 1 3/8, EGO 1.5)

GAME 6: “STAG HUNT”

p)      Stag Hunt for egoists:

Stag Hunt-- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	Column--                   Stag	Column-- Hare
Row--                   Stag	3                                      3	1     0
Row--                   Hare	0                                     1	2     2

Egoistic mixed Nash equilibrium: .5 stag--(1.5, 1.5)

 

 

q)      Stag Hunt for ALT-EGO:

Stag Hunt-- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	Column--                   Stag	Column-- Hare
Row--                   Stag	3                                      6	1     1
Row--                   Hare	0                                    1	2     4

ALT-EGO mixed Nash equilibrium: ALT .5 stag, EGO 3/8 stag--(ALT 1 3/8, EGO 1.5)

GAME 7: “CHICKEN”

s)       Chicken for egoists:

Chicken-- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	Column--          Defer/Cooperate	Column-- Assert/Defect
Row--          Defer/Cooperate	2                                      2	3     1
Row--             Assert/Defect	1                                     3	0     0

Egoistic mixed Nash equilibrium: .5 defer/cooperate--(1.5, 1.5)

 

 

t)       Chicken for ALT-EGO (payoffs modified so COOP is not dom for ALT):

Chicken-- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	Column--          Defer/Cooperate	Column-- Assert/Defect
Row--          Defer/Cooperate	2                                      4	3.5     5
Row--             Assert/Defect	1.5                                     4.5	0     0

ALT-EGO mixed Nash equilibrium: ALT assert 1/2, EGO assert 1/11--(ALT 113/44, EGO 77/44)

 

GAME 8: “PRISONER’S DILEMMA”

v)      Prisoner’s Dilemma for egoists:

Prisoner’s Dilemma-- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	Column--               Cooperate	Column-- Defect
Row--               Cooperate	2                                      2	3     0
Row--                 Defect	0                                     3	1     1

Egoistic equilibrium: Defect--(1, 1)

 

 

w)    Prisoner’s Dilemma for ALT-EGO:

Prisoner’s Dilemma-- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	Column--               Cooperate	Column-- Defect
Row--               Cooperate	2                                      4	3     3
Row--                 Defect	0                                     3	1     2

ALT-EGO equilibrium: ALT Coop EGO defect--(ALT 0, EGO 3)

GAME 9: “LEADERSHIP”

y)      Leadership for egoists:

Leadership-- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	Column--                  Follow	Column-- Lead
Row--                 Follow	1                                      1	3     2
Row--                   Lead	2                                     3	0     0

Egoistic mixed Nash equilibrium: Follow .5--(1.5, 1.5)

 

 

z)      Leadership for ALT-EGO:

Leadership-- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	Column--                  Follow	Column-- Lead
Row--                 Follow	1                                      2	3     5
Row--                   Lead	2                                     5	0     0

ALT-EGO mixed Nash equilibrium: ALT follow.75, EGO follow 5/8--(ALT 1 5/8, EGO 1.5)

GAME 10: “BATTLE OF THE SEXES”

bb)  Battle of the Sexes for egoists:

Battle of the Sexes -- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	Column--                  Defer	Column-- Assert
Row--                 Defer	0                                      0	3     2
Row--                   Assert	2                                     3	1     1

Egoistic mixed Nash equilibrium: Defer .25--(1.5, 1.5)

 

 

cc)   Battle of the Sexes for ALT-EGO:

Battle of the Sexes-- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	Column--                  Defer	Column-- Assert
Row--                 Defer	0                                      0	3     5
Row--                   Assert	2                                     5	1     2

ALT-EGO mixed Nash equilibrium: ALT Defer .25, EGO Defer 3/8--(ALT 1 5/8, EGO 1.5)

GAME 11: “COVENTRY”

ee)   Coventry for egoists:

Coventry-- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	Column--                 Defect	Column-- Cooperate
Row--                 Defect	1                                      1	3     0
Row--                   Cooperate	0                                     3	2     2

Egoistic equilibrium: Cooperate--(2, 2)

 

 

ff)    Coventry for ALT-EGO:

Coventry-- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	Column--                 Defect	Column-- Cooperate
Row--                 Defect	1                                      2	3     3
Row--                   Cooperate	0                                     3	2     4

ALT-EGO equilibrium: Cooperate--(2, 2)

GAME 12: “LEVIATHAN”

hh)  Leviathan for egoists:

Leviathan-- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	Column--                 Defect	Column-- Cooperate
Row--                 Defect	0                                      0	3     1
Row--                   Cooperate	1                                     3	2     2

Egoistic equilibrium: Cooperate--(2, 2)

 

 

ii)      Leviathan for ALT-EGO:

Leviathan-- Row payoffs in lower left—Column payoffs in upper right..	Column--                 Defect	Column-- Cooperate
Row--                 Defect	0                                      0	3     4
Row--                   Cooperate	1                                     4	4     4

ALT-EGO equilibrium: COOP (2, 2) 

ALT and EGO payoffs in the games                     ALT                                    EGO

+ = mixed Nash games

1.  Life is Great                                                   3                                        3

2.  Life is Good                                                    3                                        3

3.  Rational Trust                                                 3                                        3

4.  Trust* +                                                         5/7                                    57/35

5.  Schelling  +                                                   1 3/8                                   1.5

6.  Stag Hunt  +                                                 1 3/8                                   1.5

7.  Chicken    +                                                 113/44                               77/44

8.  Prisoner's Dilemma                                          0                                         3

9.  Leadership  +                                                1 5/8                                   1.5

10. Battle of the Sexes  +                                    1 5/8                                   1.5

11. Coventry                                                         2                                        2

12. Leviathan                                                       2                                        2

Summary--ALT relative to EGO in MIXED NASH games--The advantage for ALT in Leadership and BOTS is exactly balanced by the advantage for EGO in Schelling and Stag Hunt.  With the payoffs assigned here, ALT's advantage in Chicken (9/11) outweighs EGO's advantage in Trust (22/35)--given that this depends on specific numbers assigned, though, it is better to treat the two games as having matching and equal advantages for ALT and EGO pending a general, non-plug-in analysis.  Note that the advantages of ALT are in the three games in which the optimal solution involves the players playing different strategies and receiving different payoffs.

 

 

 

The Viability of Tying Altruism and Competititiveness in a Social Cooperation Game

Suppose a one-shot no communication social cooperation game with the following payoffs for cooperation and defection:*

                                               Column Player

                                 Cooperate                 Defect

             Cooperate          3, 3                        1, 4

   Row Player          

             Defect               4, 1                        0, 0

(To connect the game to evolutionary biology, assume that all the payoffs are objective and represent represent levels of fitness.)

There are three Nash equilibria in the game: Row defects and Column cooperates, Column defects and Row cooperates, and both play mixed strategies of cooperating and defecting with probability 1/2.

Now assume that Row is an altruist who subjectively values Column's payoffs at 1/2 his/her own.  The payoff structure now is as follows:

                                                     Column Player

                                     Cooperate                 Defect

                 Cooperate        4.5, 3                       3, 4

Altruistic Row Player          

                 Defect              4.5, 1                      0, 0

Cooperation weakly dominates defection for the altruistic Row, which will lead R to cooperate and Column to defect.  The only Nash equilibrium in the game is R cooperate and C defect.  The altruistic Row thus receives a subjective payoff of 3 but an objective fitness payoff of only 1, and is by assumption less fit than the non-altruistic Column with an objective payoff of 4. 

Now assume Row is a competitor who subjectively values half of the difference between his/her own payoff and that of the other player either positively (when his/her payoff is greater) or negatively (when his/her payoff is less).  In that case, the matrix is as follows: 

                                       Column Player

                                 Cooperate                 Defect

             Cooperate           3, 3                     -.5, 4

Competitive Row Player          

             Defect               5.5, 1                      0, 0

Defection strongly dominates cooperation for the competitive Row player; R will thus defect and Column, knowing that,will cooperate.  The only Nash equilibrium is R defect, C cooperate, with R receiving an objective payoff of 4 and C receiving an objective payoff of 1.

Assuming that types are known and that C is not required to play with the competitive R but can play with others like him/herself, the only players that the competitive R will be able to play with will be other competitive players with the same payoff structure.  Both will defect, resulting in subjective and objective payoffs of 0 and a lower level of fitness than non-competitive players playing one another will receive.

So far, the analysis recapitulates the problem of altruism analyzed by Hamilton, Maynard Smith, Price, and others, as well as posing an additional "problem" of competitiveness being maladaptive.  (That "problem" is a real problem if competitiveness is adaptive, as it might well be in certain cases, such as in inducing people to work harder than they would otherwise in situations in which such work has positive externalities.)   The key element of novelty comes at the next step, in which we consider a Row player who is both altruistic and competitive, in that he/she has a 50% probability in the one-shot game of acting as an altruistic R would and a 50% probability of acting as a competitive R would.  The payoff matrix with such an R player looks as follows: 

                                                                 Column Player

                                                        Cooperate                   Defect

                                 Cooperate           3.75, 3                    1.25, 4

Altruistic and Competitive Row Player          

                                 Defect                    5, 1                         0, 0

In this matrix, Column knows that Row will cooperate with p .5 (if R is altruistic on this play of the game) and defect with p .5 (if R is competitive on this play).  Knowing that, C will himself/herself play a mixed strategy of cooperating and defecting, each with probability .5.  The equilibrium is Nash, with neither player able to gain by departing from it.  Both the altruistic-competitive R and the nonaltruistic-noncompetitive C will receive the same objective payoffs (2 on average) over time; both types will persist over time, with neither outcompeting the other.

The takeaway: Although altruism by itself and competitiveness by itself are fitness reducing, the combination of the two can be fitness neutral.  (To the extent the altruistic-competitive type is fitter on other grounds, that type could become dominant.  That issue though is beyond the scope of the present analysis, which simply shows that altruism combined with competitiveness can be viable long-term even though neither trait is viable alone.) 

(The observant reader will note that the 50-50 cooperate-defect equilibrium in the example for both players depends on the original payoffs in the cooperation game.   So if the objective fitness payoffs were altered in the original game to make a 2/3-1/3 mix between cooperation and defection the Nash equilibrium in the original game, a viable altruist-competitive type should be altruistic 2/3 of the time and competitive 1/3 of the time in that game.  That is, fitness for the combined type should be calibrated to the particular payoffs of the game, with higher probabilities of altruism in games in which there is a higher ratio of cooperation in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.)

*The game is a variant Chicken matrix in which C-C has a greater collective payoff than C-D (either because of bargaining costs or forgone benefits of mutual cooperation).

Tying as a Solution to the Problems of Egoism and Altruism

The background to this post...reading The Price of Altruism, a biography of American evolutionary theorist and tragic eccentric George Price...

One way to look at the value competition concept is as a solution to the problem of altruism that Price and many other evolutionary theorists have worried over.  The proposed solution: "Irrational" altruism that is selected against at the individual level can become selected for when it is combined with another trait.  My candidate for the other trait: "irrational" egotism. 

Getting the argument requires understanding that there is not only a problem of altruism but a problem of egoism.  That is, commitment to acting to achieve one's own ends is rational only to a certain degree.  Beyond that limited degree, such egoistic commitment is irrational in multiple senses: One is working harder on behalf of one's ends than one wants to do, and one is also engendering resistance from others.  

The difficulty in evolving organisms with an irrational level of egoism is not a problem unless there is social value in such egoism.  But it is likely that there is such value; hard work checked by social restraints and a need to cooperate will benefit others if not the worker.  Hence, it is plausible to believe that there is a problem of egoism that needs to be set alongside the better understood if unresolved problem of altruism.

The core part of the tying argument: Although neither irrational egoism alone nor irrational altruism alone is adaptive, together they can be adaptive.  When the two are tied, altruism is no longer exploitable in the way that it is when it is unalloyed, since the wronged altruist who is also an egoist will seek vengeance unto the ends of the earth.  The problem of egoism is also solved by tying: While the unalloyed egoist is a bane to the community and maladaptive because of the community's appropriate resistance to him, the egoist who is also an altruist can be accepted by the community.  A combined egoist-altruist is thus quite clearly adaptive compared to a pure altruist or a pure egoist, and may well be adaptive compared to an individual who lacks both irrational egoism and irrational altruism.  

The tying argument in itself I believe leaves the case for altruism and egoism at the level of showing how the combination of the two attributes could be adaptive, not of proving that the combination is in fact adaptive.  To do that, one needs a further line of argument, such as the value competition argument about the internal competition in the organism between egoism and altruism.  That competition, if suitably organized, is a potential tiebreaker that makes an irrational altruistic-egoistic organism adaptive compared to a rational one lacking either trait. 

Neuroscience and Ideology--Sources

Jost, Amodio, and Phelps on ideology and psychology;

Blank on the policy implications of neuroscience;

Lieberman review essay on neuroscience and political cognition;

Cunningham faculty profile--reference to 2005 paper

Reductionism and Reverse Reductionism

A reductionist sociobiological project of explaining sociology and psychology in terms of biology lacks appeal to social scientists concerned with their own discipines.  By contrast, a reverse-reductionist value competition project of explaining pyschology in terms of democracy in the form of competition within the brain has potential to gain support from political scientists, economists, anthropologists, and sociologists.

Sociobiological Modelers

I've been reading/dipping in Evolution: the First Four Billion Years, a collection of essays and encyclopedia entries edited by Michael Ruse and Joseph Travis.  What follows is a partial list with notes on major figures in the field who seemed from their brief bios to combine sociobiology/evolutionary psych or work relevant to it with optimality modeling of some kind; omitted are people like E.O. Wilson, Dawkins, Hamilton, and Trivers whom I've already got some kind of line on:

 1.  Richard Alexander--Darwin and Human Affairs (1979); The Biology of Moral Systems (1987); UMIch emeritus--morality as indirect reciprocity; level and type of tech unclear from bio;

2.  Luigi Cavalli-Sforza--Cultural Transmission and Evolution (1981); The Neolithic Transition and the Genetics of Population in Europe (1984); Stanford emeritus--in addition to the distribution of genes work I associate him with, C-S has modelled cultural transmission; level and type of tech unclear;

3.  John Gillespie--The Causes of Molecular Evolution (1991)--uses mathematical models to contend that variable environments strongly affect molecular evolution, thus countering "neutral theory"; no direct connection to social behavior; high tech;

4.  Motoo Kimura--The Neutral Theory of Molecular Evolution (1983)--the flip side and predecessor of Gillespie; uses math to advance neutral theory, i.e., the idea that most DNA changes are random rather than adaptive; high tech;

5. George Williams--Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966)--criticism of group selection, progress, increased complexity claims--level and type of tech unclear.

A Master Theory of Human Nature?

There won't be one.  Why not evolution/evolutionary psychology?  It's the best for explaining how we came to be what we are as a species, but its reliance on natural selection, nicely as it works for biology, jibes poorly with the normative analysis of human culture and individual choice.   Why not economics?  It's the best for modeling the alignment of incentives, but its reliance on rationality, nicely as it works for some major aspects of human behavior, jibes poorly with a normative analysis of human nature.  Furthermore, economicswill not explain how we arose as a species in the way that evolution can.  Finally, why not a future science of value competition with tentacles in all of the social sciences?   It could be the best at modeling and describing irrationality and rationality together, but it will not do as well as economics does in explaining economic markets nor as well as evolution does in explaining how we came to be the creatures that we are.