Cross-Cutting Calculative and Cultural Values in Managers

First, assume that value-enhancing action by a manager is threatened by the self (S) center or the other/organization (O) center rigging the voting/feedback system that is based on internal and external signals and that operates within the manager.  If unrigged, the voting/feedback system will give both sides S and O incentives to generate value-enhancing actions; if rigged, both sides will be misaligned.   

Second, assume that the manager's voting system can be monitored and regulated either by a calculative (Calc) center or a cultural (Cult) center, the former of which is concerned with accuracy factors and the second of which is concerned with emotional factors related to the feedback system.  Whether Calc or Cult controls, like whether S or O controls, is a stochastic function affected by feedback or votes received from inside and outside the manager.  Further assume that a value-enhancing voting/feedback system is threatened by either the Calc or Cult centers rigging the system in their interests, just as it is threatened by rigging by S or O.

At this stage in the model-building, it may not seem that anything has been gained by adding the Calc and Cult centers to the S and O centers of the managerial self.  If we need a new set of guardians to guard the Calc and Cult guardians, and guardians to guard them, and so on, we enter a world of infinite or at least extensive regress, with attendant excessive costs to the manager and the organization.   But in fact, the regress and the need for additional guardians can be checked if a plausible though by no means necessarily true assumption is granted.

Calc and Cult are in competition to gain support from S-inclined and O-inclined votes at the same time S and O are in competition to gain support from Calc-inclined and Cult-inclined votes.  If Calc and Cult are orthogonal to, or cross-cutting, rather than on the same axis as S and O, all four centers have an incentive to avoid rigging.  The reason is that rigging by any one center, say S, will reduce the control benefits to be received not only by its competitor (O), but also by the other two centers (Calc and Cult).  Accordingly, if there is no same-axis alliance between two centers, a center that tries to rig will find itself resisted by the other three.   On the other hand, if a same-axis alliance prevails between, say, S and Calc, a permanent majority can form, leading to a rigged feedback process and value-reducing actions by the manager.